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1. NEEDS AND WELLBEING: ISSUES AND THEMES 
What are the relationships between human needs and human wellbeing? I will address 
the question by considering the conceptual linkages between these two umbrella 
categories. This requires investigation of the nature of each of them as a family of 
concepts. That is attempted in Sections 3 and 4 of the paper. I briefly point to the further 
topic of their empirical connections in Section 5. Bracketing these discussions, the 
opening and closing parts of the paper consider and compare human needs and human 
wellbeing as research programmes. How far is the wellbeing programme a continuation 
or successor to the tradition of thinking and investigation on human needs, and what 
lessons may arise from the somewhat troubled history of research on needs? 
 
The rise of wellbeing as an important, if not yet major, research focus in development 
studies and policy and more widely is extremely welcome and long overdue. As recently 
as 1994, Routledge’s The Social Science Encyclopedia (Kuper & Kuper 1994) could 
appear without an entry on wellbeing or quality of life or happiness. Even in two excellent 
late 1980s textbooks on the emergent field of economic psychology (Furnham & Lewis 
1986; Lea, Tarpy & Webley 1987) wellbeing remained a minor theme. Lea et al. in over 
500 pages did not discuss it as a separate topic; Furnham and Lewis devoted just four 
pages to the relationship between wealth and happiness. Often wellbeing was 
considered no topic for science; or income and wealth remained largely taken for 
granted as the synthetic concerns which would reflect or provide opportunity for every 
other value. 
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Quality of life research has, it is true, been active since the 1960s, but it has been a 
delimited specialist interest, largely confined to and within rich countries. The attention in 
the 1970s to the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) did not have much impact or 
endure. Only during the 1990s with the Human Development school centred in the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) can we say that a broader quality-of-
life focus became common in studies of low-income countries. Importantly, UNDP’s work 
has treated both income-poor and income-rich countries in the same frame.  
 
Subjective wellbeing (SWB) research too has been a partly separate, specialist interest 
of some psychologists, largely limited, again, to and within rich countries. Only with the 
large scale entry of participatory methods of investigation into development studies in 
the 1990s has attention to SWB become substantial worldwide, sometimes even 
challenging the dominance of income measures. 
 
While applauding the rise of wellbeing research, and its present appearance in 
development studies, we should remember that this is overall still rather little, rather late. 
We should diagnose old and new resistances that this research stream may face, and its 
internal limitations and problem-areas, in order to avoid or at least mitigate a subsequent 
phase of decline and even rejection such as occurred for work on basic human needs. 
The substantial 1970s wave of work on needs, the PQLI etc., was strongly criticised, 
opposed and to a large extent set aside in the 1980s and early 1990s. The opposition 
came from multiple sources, including, for example, radical Greens like Ivan Illich, not 
only from true believers in markets and economic growth. What warnings and lessons 
for tactics and strategy can we draw from the rise and fall of basic human needs 
research and policy in the 1960s to 1980s?  
  
The starting point for this paper is the hypothesis that conceptual clarification in these 
areas, wherever possible, is essential and not a luxury pastime. The needs movement 
foundered for long in a mire of messy conceptualisation. The work on wellbeing has a 
basic armoury of concepts from psychology, ethics and welfare economics (seen in the 
work of, for example, Ed Diener, Derek Parfit and Amartya Sen), but may require more 
standardisation of a shared, integrative and tested set of terms. While no set of terms 
can be more than an imperfect set of working simplifications, not all sets are equally 
adequate. Better terminology can smooth communication between and within scientific 
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communities, and influence and educate communication in wider arenas. Simplified 
concepts are an inevitable requirement in domains of social policy where research must 
interface with politics, politicians, planning, planners, public debate and debating publics. 
The difficulty is that each area of research and each forum of public debate tends to 
establish its own set of working simplifications to match its context-specific concerns. 
Even if internally adequate, the set may fail to match the sets of terms created in other 
contexts. Continuing with inconsistent and often unconsidered usages has a price. 
Careful attention is required then to which simplified schema or linked set of schemas 
will be relevant and workable, rather than risk that the wellbeing programme sinks into 
the mire or becomes pushed into a denigration zone as ‘old politics’, ‘old thinking’, like 
needs approaches were. Is such a conceptual framework attainable? 
  
The paper’s main focus is on concepts, as a basis for refining models of wellbeing and 
needs and their relations. We will address the following misconceptualisations:  
 
 First, that ‘needs’ is a single category; instead we must distinguish at least 
descriptive, instrumental and normative modes, and several different levels within each; 
 Second, that ‘Wellbeing’ (WB) is a single unified category or just SWB (itself 
presumed to be unitary), or just either ‘Objective Wellbeing’ (OWB) or SWB; instead we 
must distinguish again between several levels and related categories. 
 
More refined conceptualisation serves to establish needs approaches and wellbeing 
research as methodologies or frameworks in investigation, sets of questions rather than 
just packages of answers -- in other words, as research programmes.   
  
The WeD project, with its multidisciplinary base and use of Doyal and Gough’s complex 
theory of need, has a good start in conceptualisation. This paper looks for 
complementary insights. It does not attempt to cover all the important aspects of needs 
discourse and focuses instead on the possible interrelations with wellbeing discourse. 
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2. THE FALL AND RISE OF NEEDS THEORY 
In 1989, The Economic Journal, journal of the UK Royal Economic Society, published a 
ninety page commissioned survey of development economics by Nick Stern, later the 
Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank (2000-2003) and 
subsequently head of the Government Economic Service in the UK Treasury. The World 
Bank of the 1970s had espoused and to some degree pursued a policy priority to basic 
needs, largely interpreted as basic material needs that were to be conceptualised and 
specified by government planners, often economists. The approach was familiar from 
much earlier planning, for example in wartime, in state socialist countries and the 
Government of India and in provision for refugees. Stern, the commissioned voice of late 
1980s establishment development economics, expressed that mainstream’s rejection 
and expulsion of what was now an alien conceptual body:  
 
‘…the basic needs ideas [of ‘the so-called “basic needs” approach’; 1989: 644] 
have real problems. What needs are basic and more worryingly what levels 
are held to be essential minima? What if these levels are infeasible…? Who 
decides which needs are basic and the appropriate level? In what sense are 
they basic if people who can afford to attain them do not choose to do so? … 
[The questions] are not easy to answer in a satisfactory way and one is left 
with a certain scepticism about the approach’ (Stern 1989:  645).  
  
Ironically, during his later tenure as World Bank Chief Economist (2000-2003) and then 
as a Permanent Secretary in the UK Treasury, Stern inherited and formally endorsed the 
late 1990s commitments to the Millennium Development Goals, a programme of priority 
to basic needs fulfilment (even if only slow and partial) that represented proposed 
answers to his late 1980s questions. Some needs, such as for life of a reasonable 
duration, freedom from easily controlled diseases, literacy and numeracy, freedom from 
physical violence, are specifiable in ways that can satisfy the demands of ‘a certain 
scepticism’; as was apparent in 1989 to those who were ready to see. However, setting 
criteria of perfection for other approaches serves to eliminate them from consideration 
before one then proceeds with one’s own thoroughly imperfect approach. 
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How did the basic needs approach fall from favour? In addition to political economy and 
political circumstance, the following weaknesses contributed: first, lack of clarity in the 
approach on its diverse sources and their distinct and sometimes competing characters; 
second, lack of a technical language that was both sufficiently refined and systematised 
yet sufficiently vivid, memorable and thus usable; and third, lack of a political language 
that was sufficiently flexible and appealing.  
  
How did the basic needs approach revive and evolve into more robust forms or 
successors after the attacks and denigration in the late 1970s and 1980s? First, I 
suggest, by better distinguishing between diverse modes of needs theorising; second, by 
much stronger conceptualisation; and third, by engaging more savvily in the politics of 
ideas. 
  
In distinguishing modes, normative needs theorising and instrumental needs theorising 
were explicitly distanced from fixed commitments in psychological theory, as we will see 
in section 3.  In conceptualisation, relevant distinctions were introduced or standardised:  
 
 between needs (as priority functionings) and satisfiers (things which could allow 
those functionings); satisfiers vary enormously whereas the needs they serve can be 
shared and stable; we can thus distinguish levels of generality and distinguish stages in 
causal sequences;  
 between attaining/attainment and being able to attain (or in other words between 
functioning and capability); and between guaranteeing attainments and strengthening 
capabilities; 
 between orders of priority; for example, education and health and security are often 
given highest priority, above even employment and housing; and  
 between various types of policy-relevant activity: setting a policy framework for 
discussing ends, versus prioritising, versus setting targets, versus attempted public 
sector delivery.  
 
The systematising work along these lines by Johan Galtung, Carlos Mallmann and 
others in the late 1970s (see e.g. Lederer 1980) was too late and incomplete to save the 
basic needs approach from the antagonistic forces that arrived in power. The 
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subsequent period out of favour was used by some determined and creative theorists of 
needs (or, in Sen’s case, of a next generation of concepts), such as Penz, Braybrooke, 
Max-Neef and Sen, to systematise various conceptual and theoretical insights. Len 
Doyal and Ian Gough took over this improved toolbox, and integrated a wealth of 
relevant work from the diverse sciences of wellbeing.  
  
Peter Penz, in a 1986 book that influenced Doyal and Gough, had patiently 
deconstructed the mainstream economics principle of consumer sovereignty, which 
holds that our criterion of assessment should simply be what consumers choose or 
would choose. The principle proves to be massively under-defined, since preferences 
are in part endogenous and for several other reasons. It is only defensibly 
operationalisable by large-scale supplementation by normative principles of a quite 
different character that grow out of thinking about the substance of human interests. 
Penz was led back first to happiness as a criterion, abandoned long earlier by 
economists but much more measurable nowadays; but that criterion too is weakened by 
its endogeneity and by many of the same problems as face preference-fulfilment. He 
concluded instead in favour of basic needs, understood as the requirements of physical 
and mental health and other basic human interests (a modicum of security and social 
inclusion, etc.); as giving a conception that could rationally command the support of 
diverse political viewpoints, by ensuring the conditions needed for each of their diverse 
principles to acquire relevance (Penz 1991). 
  
Thus besides better conceptualisation, needs approaches became more effectively 
located in wider intellectual and political space. More appealing and more ethically 
charged labels were found – ‘human development’ and ‘human security’ (e.g. St. Clair 
2004, 2005; Gasper 2005a) – and then connected to the powerfully focusing and 
motivating theme of human rights. Attention-catching, thought-provoking indices were 
devised: the Human Development Index (HDI) and its siblings. And an insulated, 
influential organisational niche was created in 1989: the UN’s Human Development 
Report Office was created with intellectual independence yet public access and 
influence. In all three respects – labels, indices and niche – Mahbub ul Haq’s 
contribution was vital.  
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The next two sections concentrate on the clarification of modes and the systematisation 
of concepts, first for needs and then for wellbeing and the connections. We return in the 
final section to the politics of ideas and consider possible implications for the strategy of 
the present-day research programme on wellbeing. 
3. CONCEPTUALISING HUMAN NEEDS 
Despite considerable criticism, including in forms more hostile than Stern’s (e.g. 
Springborg 1981), the term ‘need’ continued and continues in massive, daily use in 
many fields of social policy (see Witkin & Altschuld 1995, Brazelton & Greenspan 2000), 
management, and marketing (see Jackson, Jager & Stagl 2004), including in the 
international social policy areas of the Millennium Development Goals and humanitarian 
aid. Needs language caters to extremely widespread functional requirements – to make 
analyses of motivation thicker and more realistic, and to indicate instrumental roles, 
typically towards priority objectives; but it is hard to order, precisely because of how 
widespread and varied such roles are.  
 
Meanings and obscurities 
A recent study of needs assessment in humanitarian emergencies reported that the term 
‘need’ has become a source of confusion there, given, it proposed, at least three 
substantially different meanings in the humanitarian context. 
 
1. Basic human needs (‘food is a basic human need’) 
2. A lack of basic human needs (‘these people need food’)  
3.  A need for relief assistance or some other humanitarian intervention (‘these people 
need food aid’) (Darcy & Hofmann 2003: 16). 
 
The first meaning is need as a noun, something that is needed; the second is need as a 
verb, about the needing of the noun. Darcy and Hofmann warn that a noun-language of 
need is sometimes misleading. ‘…discussion of the need for protection tends to 
“commodify” a concept that cannot be reduced to these terms’ (ibid: 17). The more 
important distinction is between the first two meanings and the third, which refers to a 
particular method or satisfier (e.g. food aid) for fulfilling the more general need (food). 
‘...needs assessment is often conflated with the formulation of responses, in ways that 
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can lead to resource-led intervention and close down other (perhaps more appropriate) 
forms of intervention’ (ibid. 2003: 16), for example monetary aid or employment provision 
rather than relief food supply.ii 
   
Darcy and Hofmann propose to drop and replace the term ‘need’ and replace it by other 
terms, including ‘risk’, particularly ‘acute risk’. In addition to the ubiquity and 
endlessness of chains of implied requirements (or, to use a less ambiguous term, 
requisites), and the noun-verb ambiguity, they hold that use of the term ‘risk’ is less 
likely to lead to the conflation of problem assessment and response formulation. In 
contrast to the word ‘need’, the word ‘risk’ will not be applied to response formulation 
too. Yet, after these remarks, and like the rest of us, Darcy and Hofmann’s report 
continues using the concepts of need and needs intensively.  
   
So although needs language can be a source of confusion at present in humanitarian 
assistance, the appropriate route may be to upgrade rather than avoid it. We can go far 
further in clarification than do Darcy and Hofmann. It is sobering to consider that 
longstanding clarifications remain little known. 
 
Modes of Needs Discourse 
Philosophers like Brian Barry (1965, 1990), Paul Taylor (1959) and David Wiggins 
(1985) consolidated a number of important insights about needs language. Several of 
them are captured in a ‘relational formula’: A needs S, if S is a necessary condition for A 
to achieve N, and N is either directly an approved priority or is a necessary condition for 
achievement of the accepted approved priority P. Policy-oriented scholars took further 
steps, adding knowledge drawn from the complexities of practical use and policy debate. 
David Braybrooke’s Meeting Needs (1987) and Doyal and Gough’s A Theory of Human 
Need (1991), in particular, highlighted that the chains of instrumental linkage can be 
long. Since they definitely do not have to contain only two or three links, a more complex 
vocabulary or usage is required. They also insist that the discourse of instrumental 
linkages towards priority objectives must be distinguished from the discourse of species-
wide behavioural potentials and propensities. This distinction had been obscured by 
optimistic evolutionary ideology, from both the political left and right.  
 
Doyal and Gough’s chapter ‘The Grammar of “Need”’ distinguished thus between: 
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1. ‘a drive or some inner state that initiates a drive…. Here “need” refers to a 
motivational force instigated by a state of disequilibrium or tension set up in an 
organism because of a particular lack (Thompson [sic], 1987, p.13)’ (Doyal & Gough 
1991: 35);  
and 
2. ‘a particular category of goals which are believed to be universalisable’ (1991: 39), 
because they are necessary conditions for avoidance of serious harm.   
 
This distinction is not consistently respected even in social science usage. I became 
more aware of this during a 1993-95 UK ESRC research project on human needs and 
wants, part of a multi-project programme on social science analyses and interpretations 
of global climate change sponsored by the Battelle Foundation. The programme led to a 
four-volume study, edited by Steve Rayner and Elizabeth Malone (1998), which included 
an extensive chapter on needs and wants (Douglas, Gasper, Ney & Thompson 1998). 
During a workshop in the needs-wants project it became evident that the participants – 
psychologists, economists, philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists – held to no 
consistent usage of ‘need’, as individuals, not only across disciplines. Yet most of us had 
read and thought about needs since the 1960s or 1970s. We jumped between different 
usages almost from one sentence to the next: between the variants identified by Darcy 
and Hofmann – more basic needs versus satisfiers; and verbs versus nouns – and also 
between needs as explanatory forces and factors, needs as (pre)requisites, and needs 
as particular sorts of moral priority claims.  
  
Investigation in a range of literature confirmed that pervasively inconsistent usage 
existed not simply between different disciplines but was ingrained in the usages within 
disciplines. Sometimes need was referred to as an inbuilt (whether inborn or inculcated) 
drive, sometimes as the implied requirement of a given objective, sometimes as a 
normative priority, sometimes as presumptively all three at once – rarely with any 
explication or apparent awareness of this complex and fluctuating usage. By 
distinguishing modes, we can identify when jumps occur, consciously examine proposed 
linkages and jumps, and assess when they are acceptable and when not.  
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The prevalence of not only multiple usages but unannounced and even undetected mid-
paragraph jumps between meanings suggested that a more emphatic and elaborate 
statement of grammar was required than in Braybrooke or Doyal and Gough. I proposed 
a fuller grammar for the field in the chapter which emerged for the Battelle study 
(Douglas et al. 1998) and more thoroughly in a 1996 paper. The main ideas appear in an 
updated version in Gasper (2004a: Ch.6). Here I will outline part of that framework, and 
then in Section 4 relate it to ideas concerning wellbeing.  
  
We can usefully distinguish three modes. In mode A, ‘need’ is a term used in 
evaluatively neutral description or explanation: to refer to a want or a drive or a potential. 
In mode B, a ‘need’ is a requisite for achieving an objective. Thus the requisite’s 
normative necessity depends on the status of the objective, and on how essential it is for 
reaching that objective. In mode C, a ‘need’ establishes a strong normative claim since 
the objective is a normative priority, and the requisite is indeed essential. In all modes 
there is an ambiguity inasmuch as ‘need’ is sometimes applied to the objective and 
sometimes to the implied requisite. Further, whereas in mode A ‘need’ typically figures 
as a noun, a presence, in mode B it can often appear as a verb, a lack.iii  
  
What are the relationships of the modes? First, mode C, concerning priority objectives 
and requisites, is of course a subset of mode B which concerns any objectives and 
requisites. But we might sometimes encounter references to an instrumental mode as 
containing only the instrumental usages which are not in mode C. Second, mode A often 
overlaps with the other two, when fulfilment of some mode A need, some want or drive 
or potential, is seen as necessary for achievement of a specified objective (mode B), 
which may be a normative priority (mode C). Table 2.1 illustrates these interrelations, 
showing five possible cases. The five cases are:- purely in mode A (case 1); purely in 
mode B (cases 4 and 5); in both modes (cases 2 and 3). If in mode B, a need can be 
either also in mode C or only of mode B. We examine these cases further in Section 4. 
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Table 2.1. A modal analysis of the five types of ‘need’ 
  
NOT MODE B 
MODE B 
MODE B 
ONLY 
MODE C 
ALSO 
MODE A Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
NOT MODE A - Type 5 Type 4 
 
The threefold division of modes is an extension and generalisation of Doyal and Gough’s 
contrast between a motivational force and an universalisable value or goal. Mode A 
covers more types of descriptive entity than only types of motivational force and covers 
more motivational forces than only drives; mode C could cover more types of normative 
claimant than universalisable goals; and we have, in addition, highlighted mode B. 
  
Distinguishing mode B too is important: it is widespread in social science and everyday 
usage; it is correspondingly highlighted in Taylor’s (1959) classic semantic dissection; 
and, vitally, recognising it helps us to understand why and how the common conceptual 
slippage between modes A and C occurs.  
 
If we check our framework against some dictionary definitions of need we find all modes 
in use, but no discipline appears to refer regularly to all three (see Table 2.2). One –  the 
social science discipline with the greatest resources and political influence, economics – 
has often tried to abandon the term altogether. Fortunately it remains the exception.  
 
Table 2.2. A comparison of the modes employed in definitions of need 
 ECONOMICS 
DICTIONARY 
SOCIOLOGY 
DICTIONARY 
PSYCHO-
LOGY 
DICTIONARY 
POLITICS 
DICTIONARY 
PHILOSOPHY 
COMPANION 
DOYAL & 
GOUGH 
MODE A - X X   X 
MODE B - X  X X  
MODE C - - (X) (X) (X) X 
  
The Penguin Dictionary of Economics (5th edition) ignores the term ‘need’ (and ‘basic 
need’). This is not an outlier case. Mainstream economics has systematically shunned 
needs-theorising, partly due to a confusion between modes. (Vivid examples of both 
shunning and confusion, over several decades, are collected in Jackson et al. 2004.) 
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Resistance to engaging in mode C discourse on ethically/publicly reasoned priorities as 
opposed to reliance on individual preferences alone, and objection further to claims that 
the State should then provide such priority items, has contributed irrationally to rejection 
of mode A and mode B discourses too, as if the three were inseparable. Much of 
economics remains primitive or completely deficient in explanation of wants, as if this 
would impugn the sovereign consumer, and in investigation of human requisites, which 
can become politically embarrassing for the privileged. For study of human requisites 
Dasgupta (1993) is a noble exception; he endorses the N-word. 
  
The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology (1994) records two meanings: first, a need as a 
factor that motivates individuals – this fits our mode A; and second, need as a functional 
prerequisite – this fits mode B. 
  
The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology (2001) records what it considers are two main 
meanings and some subsidiary (more problematic or less common) ones. 1) ‘Some thing 
or state of affairs which, if present would improve the wellbeing of an organism.’ This 
seems to fit mode C, if we take wellbeing as a normative category, as is implied by the 
name. However, the lack of specification of which type of organism (a bacterium?) 
leaves the ethical status of the needs in doubt. 2) ‘The internal state of an organism that 
is in need of such a thing or state of affairs’ – this concerns a lack, as compared to the 
first meaning, which concerned what would remedy a lack. In addition: 3a) a need as a 
drive – a mode A meaning, which the dictionary correctly warns often does not apply for 
mode C needs; and 3b) a need as a motive or incentive, wish, desire or craving – in 
other words, other mode A meanings. 
  
The Oxford Dictionary of Politics (2003) adopts mode B: ‘what is required in order to do 
something or achieve some state of being.’ It continues: ‘Human needs’, for example, 
have been taken to describe requirements which must be satisfied if harm to an agent is 
to be avoided’. If we deem ‘harm’ a morally charged term, then the supportive definition 
perhaps moves into mode C; likewise when, later in the entry, purported needs are the 
proposed ‘requirements of human flourishing’. However, the language here is evaluative, 
indicating what is desirable, rather than prescriptive, indicating what is proposed for 
action in the light of all relevant factors. 
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The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995) sits in the same way near the border of 
modes B and C but perhaps within mode B: ‘what an organism requires to live the 
normal life of its kind’, with ‘normal’ promptly clarified as ‘flourishing rather than merely 
surviving’. Absence of the need (or, to be precise, a need-satisfier) causes harm. But the 
definition speaks of any organism, not specifically human beings, which weakens any 
presumption that the flourishing involved (of say a mosquito) carries normative 
significance in a moral universe of humans. 
 
Doyal and Gough’s theory of need highlights the distinction between modes A and C 
(1991: Ch.3). It investigates the content of needs that derive from the requirements of 
being a competent member of one’s society and of avoiding fundamental harm. It does 
not highlight and define mode B in addition to modes A and C. 
   
Definition of only modes A and C leaves the two apparently quite different and evokes 
too little modal caution. The incoherent pattern of usage across disciplines can be better 
understood and remedied by delineation of mode B in addition. We can then see how 
mode B usage and mode A usage are too easily slid into each other, since both are 
positive: normatively neutral. And we can see also, how mode B and mode C usages are 
too easily fused, since both use an instrumental logic and there is ambiguity often over 
whose are the objectives referred to (e.g. ‘the organisation’s objectives’, ‘the policy’s 
objectives’, ‘society’s objectives’). Overall, usage across the whole field, from mode A 
through to C, can slide thus into an often incoherent, undifferentiated mire.  
 
Elements of normative needs discourse 
Within mode C discourse a number of further elements must be distinguished. One 
could similarly elaborate within mode A, as psychologists and phenomenologists do; but 
here we focus on normative needs discourse, as prelude to a discussion of well-being. 
Braybrooke identified the following constituent elements in normative needs discourse: 
 
1. implicitly, a decision-making group deciding for a particular target population within a 
particular political community (the three can be identical but are often not); 
2. a criterion/ target objective which one uses to determine need – for example, health 
or autonomy or a conception of human flourishing; 
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3. a set of types of need, derived as proposed necessary implications of that criterion; 
4. a set of levels, such as illustrated later in the middle column of Table 2.4, at each of 
which levels we specify satisfiers contributing towards the chosen criterion; 
5. at each level, for each of the types of need, (where relevant) a specified indicator 
and a specified provision target.  
 
For our present purposes a few points merit highlighting. First, concerning the 
instrumental linkages between levels:  a satisfier can contribute to fulfilling several 
needs; a need/lack can often be met by many alternative satisfiers; and not all proposed 
satisfiers are effective. Second, within mode C (normative) needs discourse, each 
possible criterion of priority generates a particular specification of implied requirements, 
normatively fundamental needs. The criteria found in use range from as little as survival 
(to a normal human life-span) to as much as ‘human flourishing’ (Gasper 1996, 2004a). 
Thus, third, from an understanding of mode C needs as the requisites for wellbeing, we 
see that different conceptions of wellbeing lead to different specifications of need. And 
fourth, each particular level chosen as the focus in needs discourse matches a particular 
sort of conception of wellbeing, as Section 4 will now show.  
 
CONCEPTS OF WELLBEING AND THEIR INTERRELATIONS WITH CONCEPTS OF 
NEED 
Conceptual confusion is widespread within the field of wellbeing too. One factor has 
been that mainstream economics, shielded and satisfied by its doctrine of people’s 
wants/ preferences as the central and sometimes even only acceptable normative 
criterion, long avoided the empirical and conceptual investigation of wellbeing, 
abandoning it to other disciplines. 
  
We should again distinguish several variants and several levels. The various concepts of 
wellbeing in use will be seen to correspond primarily to different levels. A contrast 
between modes is less important here, for wellbeing is more consistently a normative 
concept than is need. Perhaps ironically, this normative concept of wellbeing includes a 
major branch known as ‘objective wellbeing’, in contrast to so-called ‘subjective 
wellbeing’. OWB centrally considers externally assessed and approved, and thereby 
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normatively endorsed, non-feeling features of a person’s life, for example matters like 
mobility and morbidity. SWB centrally refers to feelings and/or judgements of the person 
whose wellbeing is estimated.  
 
If the approver is the person herself, and if feeling good is an approved feature, indeed, 
even the overriding approved feature, then we would have a case where the OWB and 
SWB categories overlap. In general, however, the approved features concern non-
feelings aspects: such as health, longevity, autonomy and access to desired or approved 
opportunities. Insofar as health covers mental health, then the categories can overlap 
there, for example with reference to depression or its absence. Further, the more that 
feelings are based on systematic and deep reflection, the more might SWB overlap in 
character with OWB. 
  
The ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ labels are often unsatisfactory. As Veenhoven, among 
others, stresses, the ambiguity in the meanings of OWB and SWB causes confusion and 
is pernicious yet soluble. The figure indicates that we need at least four categories not 
two. Feelings can be ‘objectively’ studied, by externals, as in case II in Table 2.3 below; 
and as in case IV in the figure, self-reports on feelings are sometimes valid and reliable 
measures.iv  
 
Table 2.3. The scope for confusion in usage of ‘subjective / objective wellbeing’ 
 THE FOCUS OF MEASUREMENT / 
ESTIMATION (main criterion) 
‘Objective’, as 
focused on externally 
approved non-feelings 
 
‘Subjective’, as 
focused on feelings 
 
METHOD OF 
MEASUREMENT / 
ESTIMATION 
(subsidiary criterion) 
 
‘Objective’, as 
external measurement 
/ estimation 
Case I: Focus on 
externally approved 
and estimated non-
feelings; 
clearly ‘OWB’ 
 
Case II 
‘Subjective’, as using  
subject’s self-report 
 
Case III 
Case IV: 
clearly ‘SWB’ 
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The philosopher Derek Parfit (1984)’s influential list went one step further than an 
SWB/OWB division and contained three types of notion of wellbeing: 
 
 Hedonism: wellbeing as pleasure; 
 Desire theories: wellbeing as the fulfilment of preferences/desires; 
 Objective list theories: wellbeing as the attainment of the elements in a list of what 
makes a life well-lived.  
 
Hedonism represents a crude version of the SWB conceptualisation, crude because 
psychologists identify other aspects of feelings besides pleasure. Objective list theories 
correspond to OWB. Influenced by the practice of economics, Parfit adds preference 
fulfilment to the list. It is a distinct conception because preference fulfilment does not 
necessarily give pleasure and is not always in normatively approved forms. When we 
ask what the preferences are for or about, we get a hint that we may have to go further 
than a list of three. Are the preferences for commodities, for characteristics, for 
satisfaction, for (in Sen’s terms) other-oriented agency objectives, or something else? 
 
Seven concepts of wellbeing 
If we take the categories added to micro- and welfare economics by Kelvin Lancaster, 
Sen and others, and connect them to traditional categories in economics and ethics, we 
obtain an extended narrative sequence of how control over resources connects through 
to human fulfilment, as outlined in Table 2.4 (to be read from bottom to top).  
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Table 2.4. Relating concepts of wellbeing to the stages in Sen’s enriched narrative 
of consumer choice, consumption and functioning 
 
CONCEPTS OF 
WELLBEING 
(based on Gasper 2005b) 
ALTERNATIVE LEVELS OF 
FOCUS IN STUDIES OF 
WELLBEING:  PUTATIVE 
NARRATIVE SEQUENCE 
(from bottom to top)  
(source: Gasper 2004b) 
DOYAL & GOUGH’S 
LEVELS IN ‘A THEORY OF 
NEED’ (1991) (with some 
contents of the more limited 
variant on their p.170, and 
broad equivalences to levels 
in the narrative sequence)  
4D: Objective list IV HUMAN FULFILMENT  
as value fulfilment 
 
7: Pleasure/satisfaction = 
SWB  
(if we presume a crude 
mental model) 
‘Utility’ – as HAPPINESS 
&/OR SATISFACTION  
(this is, clearly, not a unitary 
category; different aspects 
can be distinguished) 
 
6B. Preference fulfilment II ‘Utility’ – as DESIRE 
FULFILMENT 
 
4C. Objective list  III 
         (the central OWB focus) 
FUNCTIONINGS 
(other than satisfaction) 
‘UNIVERSAL GOAL’ = 
avoidance of serious harm to 
persons (incl. social 
exclusion),  
5. Capability / positive 
freedom 
CAPABILITY 
(the range of lives which a 
person could attain) 
 
4B. Objective list II CAPABILITIES (people’s 
skills, capacities); and other 
characteristics of people 
‘BASIC NEEDS’ = an 
‘optimum’ of physical health 
and autonomy of agency 
4A. Objective list I CHARACTERISTICS OF 
GOODS, which are acquired 
through consumption. 
‘UNIVERSAL SATISFIER 
CHARACTERISTICS’ = 
adequate nourishment, 
shelter, education, 
environment, security, 
personal relationships, etc. 
3. Activity  CONSUMPTION proper 
– viz., actual use of 
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purchases / acquisitions. 
1B. Opulence II PURCHASES and other 
acquisitions 
SPECIFIC SATISFIERS 
6A. Preference fulfilment I  
2. Choice 
‘Utility’ as CHOICE, which is 
typically assumed to reflect 
preference, and (as default 
case) weighted according to 
purchasing power. 
 
1A. Opulence I INCOME AND RESOURCES 
/ POWER TO ACQUIRE 
GOODS/COMMODITIES 
SOCIETAL 
PRECONDITIONS 
(MATERIAL AND 
PROCEDURAL) FOR NEED 
SATISFACTION  
 
The role of the table is not to insist that this is exactly how wellbeing must be conceived. 
Many of the main determinants of wellbeing, such as family life and friendship, religion 
and other belief systems, culture and role designations, do not readily fit into this 
economics-derived perspective. However the extended sequence indicates how several 
different conceptions of the content (rather than sources) of wellbeing can be seen as 
focusing on different levels in this sequence. It helps us to grasp the plurality of 
wellbeing conceptions.   
  
Table 2.4’s first column presents the following seven wellbeing concepts, some of which 
have variants. 
 
1. To judge wellbeing in practice, economists have traditionally focused on level 1A: 
control over or power to acquire commodities, as indicated by income and wealth; 
and level 1B, the acquisition of commodities. In Sen’s terms this focus on control 
over things is a focus on opulence.  
2. Economists have also used the concept of revealed preference: the presumption that 
choices fully reflect preferences. There are two associated conceptions of wellbeing 
that focus neither on things nor on further outcomes. First, since the presumption 
that choices fully reflect preferences is empirically mistaken, the implied or 
sometimes explicit stance is that wellbeing lies in making choices, whether or not 
these prove to fulfil ex ante preferences or promote other results. Second is the 
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stance that wellbeing consists in the fulfilment of (ex ante) preferences, regardless of 
the real outcomes they bring. Since preferences can be formulated and focused 
upon for outcomes at various levels/stages – commodities, characteristics, 
functionings and so on – the conception of WB as preference fulfilment in fact 
emerges at several levels. Two are indicated in table 2.4: 6A – fulfilment of 
preferences for obtaining certain goods, and 6B – fulfilment of preferences for 
attaining certain functionings. 
3. Somewhat outside economists’ categories is a third broad conception of wellbeing – 
as activity per se. It perhaps spans aspects of choice, purchase and consumption, 
and also includes some functionings and the stages of activity that precede and lead 
up to income and resources. In face of the accumulated evidence of a ‘hedonic 
treadmill’ in materially affluent countries, where ever more activity leads to no or very 
few hedonic gains (and perhaps far smaller gains than if they were not pursued via 
the path of commodity -production, -acquisition, -bonding and -discarding), this 
activist conception of wellbeing represents a Promethean defiance. Henry Bruton’s 
On The Search for Well-Being (1997) gives one statement of such a stance, by a 
distinguished development economist of the 1960s through 1990s.  
4. Several stages in the narrative correspond to some ‘objective-list’ conception of 
wellbeing, or to some sort of component in an ‘objective list’: certain characteristics 
acquired through consumption (this is the level of ‘universal satisfier characteristics’ 
stressed by Doyal & Gough); certain capabilities, seen as skills and abilities; certain 
functionings, such as long and healthy life; and value fulfilment, eudaimonia. I have 
grouped them here as variant conceptions of OWB, but one could also treat some or 
all of them separately. 
5. Treated separately in the classification is Sen’s category of capability. It too could be 
treated as an objective-list conception, but it has achieved independent prominence. 
Arguably the degree of prominence is more than it deserves, for a plausible 
conception of wellbeing will span a number of aspects, as Sen periodically points 
out. 
6. Preference fulfilment is purportedly central in economists’ treatment of wellbeing. 
Economists, unlike psychologists, retreated from direct attention to utility (ophelimity) 
as felt wellbeing.v It thereby came to focus instead, in principle, on preference 
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fulfilment. In practice, however, this was reduced to wellbeing as choice or as sheer 
activity (conceptions 2 and 3 above).  
7. Lastly, our old friend, wellbeing as pleasure or satisfaction – SWB, or at least one 
version of it – has been rarely studied by economists, until very recently. It has been 
left to other disciplines, whose findings most of economics then ignores.  
  
The final column of Table 2.4 presents key components of Doyal and Gough’s theory of 
need, in the same levels/stages format that has been applied to the concepts of 
wellbeing. Doyal & Gough’s book did not itself make this precise comparison or exact 
links to the capability approach or wellbeing discourse. In the more limited variant of their 
theory, the ‘universal goal’ is ‘Avoidance of serious harm: minimally disabled social 
participation’ (1991: 170). This corresponds to the level or narrative-stage of 
‘functionings’ in Sen’s sense, what people are and do. The implied basic needs of 
physical health and autonomy of agency correspond to a level of concrete capabilities, 
not to Sen’s abstracted general notion of capability. Mental health needs enter as 
requirements of autonomy of agency.vi 
 
Interrelations between concepts of need and concepts of wellbeing 
 
To probe further the relations between the conceptual fields of needs and wellbeing, 
Figure 2.1 reformats Table 2.1’s modal analysis of types of need, as a Venn diagram. 
The intersections of the three need modes give five cases, five areas in the diagram. 
 The uppermost rectangle represents needs which are wants and/or behavioural 
drives (in other words, needs in mode A). It consists of areas 1 + 2 + 3. 
 The middle rectangle represents needs which are requirements for a given objective 
(in other words, in mode B). It consists of areas 2 + 3 + 4 + 5. 
 The third rectangle is a subset of the middle one and represents needs as normative 
priority requirements (in other words, in mode C). It consists of areas 3 + 4. This 
normative concept of need links – somewhat ironically in terms of labelling, as we noted 
– to the concept of objective wellbeing. 
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Figure 2.1. Venn diagram of the three modal usages of ‘needs’ 
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Area/case 3 indicates behavioural drives or wants which fulfil normative priority 
requirements. In a humanist/welfarist conception the central priority may be human 
wellbeing, typically interpreted as OWB (the formulation of which may or may not 
subsume SWB). Behind much of the sloppy usage of the term ‘need’ lies a presumption 
that all drives are of the area 3 type. This rests on an exceptionally rosy theory of human 
nature: that evolution or Providence have selected for us only those drives which lead to 
the promotion of normative priorities; thus all drives are supposed to be found in area 3, 
and areas 1 and 2 are presumed empty. Also contributing to casual usage is a sister 
presumption, that we have no normative priorities which are not targeted by behavioural 
drives; in other words, that area 4 is empty. 
 
In reality: 
 Some drives fulfil no objective (see area 1 in Figure 2.1); they are non-functional, 
perhaps outmoded relics from prehistory.vii  
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 Some drives fulfil an objective but not one that is a normative priority (case 2). This 
could be the case for some drives that promote SWB that is not considered OWB; 
possibly the drives of the addict. Some drives are even dysfunctional, leading to 
undesirable outcomes. They might be evolutionary experiments that failed but have not 
been eliminated, perhaps because too deeply wired-in, or, again, that may once have 
been functional but became outmoded.  
 Many requisites for particular objectives are not drive-based (cases 4 and 5). 
Uunfortunately, some of these concern normative priority objectives (case 4). Some 
case 4 instances may be examples that promote OWB but not SWB.  
 Case 5 concerns instances where a requisite serves some function but one that is 
not of normative priority and that, perhaps fortunately, has no behavioural drive behind it. 
  
In sum, case 3 is the ideal or classical case, but is not the only one, contrary to those 
who treat the term ‘need’ in a way that does not distinguish modes. A more realistic 
assessment is that many drives do not do promote normative priorities, some of these 
drives being dangerous and some indifferent; and that many functional requirements and 
normative priorities are not drive-based. 
 
The danger case is case 2, where drives fulfil non-priority objectives, perhaps even anti-
objectives. The other problem case is case 4, where normative priority objectives lack a 
behavioural motor behind them; a need’s sheer lack does not itself ‘serve to motivate or 
mobilise the subject’ (Jackson et al. 2004: 11). Case 1 might be problematic too: drives 
that fulfil no objective instead divert us. Case 5 concerns undriven objectives of no 
significance and appears innocuous. 
  
We have a number of interesting conclusions from this further step in modal analysis. 
Case 3 is not the only important case; and the value of needs discourse is not limited to 
or by the occurrence of case 3. Cases 1, 2 and 4, none of which matches the classical 
conception of needs, are all important cases for thinking about the promotion of 
wellbeing. Fulfilment of mode A needs is not the sole and guaranteed route to wellbeing.  
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4. METHODOLOGICAL AND PROGRAMMATIC REFLECTIONS 
To draw conclusions on how wellbeing research can benefit from needs theory, let us 
review what needs theory is for, then ask in what ways it might serve wellbeing research, 
and wellbeing research in low-income countries in particular. 
 
Needs theory for wellbeing research? 
What is the goal of needs theory? First, it has an explanatory branch and purpose: to 
extend our explanatory repertoire beyond ‘economic man’ and other overly crude 
models. Second, it has a normative task: to structure, rationalise and humanise policy 
prioritisation, to extend our evaluative repertoire beyond the criterion of per capita 
income, and also beyond what is usually now embodied in Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs). Thirdly, in both cases it has a communicative function: to further the 
explanatory and normative tasks by frameworks that are simple enough, yet robust 
enough, to be both usable and not too misleading in routine professional and political 
discourse. 
  
The post-fall revival in the 1990s of needs theory in both explanatory and normative 
branches, sometimes under new names and in more advanced versions, suggests that it 
can contribute helpfully in these roles. We see important explanatory work, such as that 
of Ryan and Deci, and normative and policy work on the HDI, Human Development 
Reports, Millennium Development Goals, humanitarian intervention and – insofar as 
human rights must often rest on claims about human needs (Doyal & Gough 1991; 
Galtung 1994; Gasper 2005c) – on rights-based approaches.  
  
Specifically for wellbeing research, our Venn diagram analysis shows that needs 
discourse offers one valuable framework in the study of wellbeing, provided it is treated 
as a complex frame that gives space for our minds to work – as a tool in a research 
programme. It generates an agenda of three important types of situation for us to study 
(cases 1, 2 and 4), in addition to the optimistic case 3 that is widely presumed. 
  
How far is Doyal and Gough’s theory, a normative theory constructed for ethics and 
planning with primary reference to high-income countries, relevant for the study of 
wellbeing in low-income countries? Needs discourse has a role in critiquing income 
measures as extremely insufficient and quite often misleading. Most evidence suggests 
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that income remains one significant contributor to subjective wellbeing for low-income 
countries but not beyond middle-income levels.viii Doyal and Gough’s approach, the spirit 
of which we presented in Section 3, contributes an intellectual clarity and a refined 
framework for instrumental and normative analyses. It helps us think about modes, 
levels, indicators, the choices of normative priority criterion, and the use of available 
theory and evidence from many fields, together with practical reason, to specify the 
factors that influence key elements in real people’s lives. At the same time, it is not itself 
a complex explanatory framework, and should be complemented by good explanatory 
analyses, including from within needs mode A. Arguably, the revival of needs 
approaches may only be sustained if backed and guided by such deeper explanatory 
research. Effective conceptualisations, albeit working simplifications, might be those that 
are informed by sustained investigation of the empirics. Let us look at two areas. 
 
Research on the dynamics of need definition  
Hamilton (2003) laments the divorce between, in our terms, mode A analyses of needs 
and mode C analysis of need, and the neglect, in his view, of the former. While showing 
limited insight into work in modes B and C, and exaggerating the difference between his 
conceptual framework and that of Doyal & Gough, his book on needs interestingly 
tackles interactions between the modes, notably the dynamics of transformation of mode 
A needs, and the processes of emergence of some felt needs as approved priorities. 
Hamilton notes that drives are not only instinctual in origin but are continually newly 
generated and also dissipated. He investigates the dynamics of transformation, including 
from pure wants to felt needs in the sense of drives, and how this mode-A need 
generation and transformation can affect what are instrumental requirements and agreed 
priorities. There can be moves from the status of pure want to the status of felt mode-C 
need, i.e. felt approved needs. Sometimes the reverse happens.  
  
Figure 2.1 also arouses our curiosity concerning its area 4: normative needs which are 
not felt needs. In needs-mode A, needs which are not felt means unconscious drives; in 
mode B unfelt needs concern, for example, requirements for professional success which 
are not part of a person’s desires-system and are sometimes even inconsistent with it; 
whereas in mode C they concern any requirements for approved goals (e.g. health) 
which are not part of the desire-system. To be part of a person’s system of wants and 
desires is of course not sufficient for ensuring need fulfilment; in commodity-based 
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societies, for example, law-abiding members who have no money are unable to fulfil 
many or most of their wants or needs. But for normative needs to be not part of the 
wants-system raises particular problems, which a wellbeing oriented needs approach will 
investigate. Can space 4, the sphere of priority needs that are divorced from wants, be 
diminished? – by developing wants corresponding to those needs, or finding functional 
substitutes for fulfilment of those needs?  
 
Research on substantive interconnections between wellbeing and need fulfilment 
In mode A discourse, ‘real needs’ are drivers of behaviour; in mode C discourse, ‘real 
needs’ are those ‘needs’ whose fulfilment brings wellbeing. Not all (mode A) need 
fulfilment leads to wellbeing, whatever our interpretation of the latter – except perhaps in 
the bizarre yet influential interpretation of wellbeing as sheer activity. Using Manfred 
Max-Neef’s language, we can speak of ‘pseudo-needs’: behavioural drives which fail to 
bring mature reflective satisfaction. Max-Neef’s (1991) typology of needs and satisfiers is 
thought-provoking and should also be research-provoking. ‘Pseudo satisfiers’ give only 
fleeting fulfilment; ‘violators’ completely fail to satisfy, yet one may be habituated to 
them; ‘inhibiting satisfiers’ satisfy one need (often a short-term one) but at the cost of 
reducing satisfaction of other needs; and ‘synergistic satisfiers’ fulfil several needs at 
once, unlike ‘singular satisfiers’. We do typically seek to fulfil several needs at once, as 
cultural theorists demonstrate - but how well the satisfiers that we choose do this 
requires empirical evaluation and the answer is frequently critical. Modern market 
society can drive us onto commercialised hedonic treadmills which bring no enduring 
values but which destroy some values and destroy our habitat (Jackson et al. 2004).  
  
The Venn diagram thus illustrates the sort of research agendas on wellbeing that arise in 
mode C needs discourse. These agendas are partly empirical, drawing from 
investigations in mode B: what leads to what, under which circumstances?; and partly 
ethical, in arguments about the normative status of the outcomes and processes, for 
example in the discussion of different interpretations of ‘wellbeing’. The empirical agenda 
has been insightfully pursued by, for example, Deci and Ryan, Diener, Illich, Robert 
Lane, Maslow, Theodore Roszak, Tibor Scitovsky and others. The ethical agenda has 
been pursued by philosophers. The deepest insights may come from authors who 
connect and cross-fertilise the two agendas, such as Fromm and Galtung, Giri, 
Nussbaum and Sen.  
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Politics of discourse 
The research agendas of needs and wellbeing are of fundamental importance. How can 
these linked research programmes proceed effectively in political-intellectual-
organisational space, aware not only of the precision, logic and empirical reference of 
discourse but also of its politics ? 
  
One lesson from the rise and fall of the basic needs approach in the 1960s to 1980s is 
the importance of clarification of concepts. We must in addition keep on monitoring 
them. Language in such territories is slippery and not stable, even if it appears stabilised 
in the short run. The word ‘want’, for example, evolved from meaning lack or need, to 
now mean desire.  
 
A second possible lesson is of the importance of labels. ‘Basic needs’ as a label was 
unappealing to many. ‘Wellbeing’ appears to work better. But how appealing, we should 
consider and check, is ‘wellbeing’ as a label really? When will it promote priority to the 
basic needs of the poorest and under what conditions? 
  
A third lesson is that is essential to invest not only in cross-disciplinary alliances but to 
build trans-disciplinary cooperation. The basic human needs work remained, despite the 
valiant efforts of thinkers such as Galtung, a weakly integrated product of a series of 
weakly cooperating intellectual communities, from economics, philosophy, psychology, 
health and nutrition. Many of the economists involved felt apparently that they could do 
nearly the whole job, or at least the job of synthesis; but they failed to build a structure 
with the depth and sophistication required to withstand the scepticism and even hostility 
of diverse stakeholders and other intellectual and political traditions. Presently too, the 
wellbeing and human development streams of work remain insufficiently connected. The 
UNDP-related Human Development work continues dominated by (broad-minded) 
economists, who are only recently and tentatively opening to the riches of research on 
wellbeing and needs. Fortunately, a strong feature of the WeD work is close long-term 
cooperation between researchers from psychology, health, economics, anthropology 
and social policy. Outreach to others, in philosophy, politics, sociology, planning, 
education and social work, and in the humanities, will be important too.   
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i
 I would like to thank Ian Gough for very helpful advice. 
ii
 The study later implicitly adds perhaps other meanings of need: 4. what is required for reducing 
the non-fulfilment of basic human needs, and 5. what is required for providing relief assistance or 
whatever other policy response. Each of these requisites will then have its own requirements. 
iii
 Within these modes, there are dozens of different specific concepts of need (as indicated in 
Gasper 1996, 2004a). Some are worth grouping further and keeping separate from others. For 
example, in mode A, needs which are expected to explain wants might be contrasted with needs 
that are expected to explain satisfactions; likewise, inborn needs against inculcated needs. 
iv
 From decades of research, Veenhoven (2004) advises that we should use a 3x3 rather than 
2x2 matrix of categories, with nine possibilities rather than four, while recognizing that we face a 
spectrum of possibilities along each axis rather than clear cut divides. 
v
 Let alone attention to utility as the possession of useful characteristics or performance of useful 
functionings, as considered by many sociologists, psychologists, designers, engineers and 
planners. 
vi
 Doyal and Gough discussed ‘capabilities/functionings’ as a package notion (1991: 156) and 
thus did not make the precise links. They instead tried to link their ‘basic needs’ to the level of 
functionings (1991: 156). Nor did they use the distinction between capability (Sen’s category) and 
capabilities (Nussbaum’s). 
vii
 In the case of wellbeing interpreted as activity, however, this category might be null, since all 
activity is deemed good. 
viii
 Income remains a significant contributor until upper middle-income status (perhaps around 
$8,000 per capita p.a., suggested the World Values Survey (Dutt 2001). 
